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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Boise police officers pulled over a car driven by Jamie Proffitt, purportedly for 
failing to signal his intention to change lanes for not less than 100 feet. A subsequent 
investigation led to his arrest for resisting or obstructing an officer and a subsequent 
search led to the discovery of methamphetamine in his possession. Mr. Proffitt moved 
to suppress the evidence against him arguing, in part, that the State failed to establish 
that his warrantless seizure was reasonable as officers lacked probable cause to 
believe that he had not signaled for at least 100 feet prior to changing lanes; however, 
the district court denied his motion. Mr. Proffitt entered a conditional guilty plea to 
possession of methamphetamine preserving his right to challenge the district court's 
order denying his motion to suppress. He asserts that the district court erred by finding 
that the State established officers had probable cause to seize him for failing to signal 
for not less than 100 feet. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Complaint alleging that Jamie Proffitt had committed the crimes 
of possession of methamphetamine and resisting. or obstructing officers. (R., pp.8-9.) 
During the preliminary hearing, Officer Andrea Matheus of the Boise Police Department 
testified that she was a passenger in Officer Kirk Rush's police car when she "noticed 
that the suspect vehicle had failed to use their turn signal for 100 feet or five seconds 
before maneuvering over to the left lane," and she informed Officer Rush. (Tr. Prelim., 
p.6, L.10 - p.8, L.3.) Although Officer Rush did not see Mr. Proffitt violate any traffic 
laws, he pulled him over based upon Officer Matheus' observations. (Tr. Prelim., p.23, 
1 
L.9 - p.24, L.25.) Mr. Proffitt was nervous, did not fully comply with the officers' 
commands, and he was eventually arrested for resisting or obstructing officers. (Tr. 
Prelim., p.8, L.4 - p.13, L.20.) A search incident to arrest revealed that Mr. Proffitt was 
in possession of a small amount of methamphetamine. (Tr. Prelim., p.30, L.15 - p.33, 
L.13.) Mr. Proffitt was bound over into the district court and an Information was filed 
charging him with the above crimes. (R., pp.27-30.) 
Mr. Proffitt moved to suppress the evidence against him based upon two 
grounds: 1) that his initial, warrantless seizure was unreasonable; and, 2) that even if 
the initial seizure was lawful, the subsequent search of his pockets was based upon an 
unconstitutional expansion of the traffic stop. 1 (R., pp.41-42, 50-59.) The district court 
denied the motion. (R., pp.78-79; Tr. 11/5/12, p.94, L.5 - p.106, L.23.) Thereafter, 
Mr. Proffitt entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine 
specifically preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on 
appeal; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the resisting or obstruction officers 
charge. (R., pp.81-89; Tr. 11/16/12.) The district court sentenced Mr. Proffitt to a 
unified term of seven years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed 
Mr. Proffitt on probation for a period of seven years. (R., pp.94-102; Tr. 1/18/13, p.15, 
L.11 - p.24, L.5.) Mr. Proffitt filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.104-106.) 
1 Mr. Proffitt does not challenge the district court's ruling that his arrest and ultimate 
search were not a product of an unlawful extension of his initial seizure in this appeal. 
However, he asserts that if this Court finds his initial seizure was unlawful, his 
subsequent arrest and search are fruits of that initial seizure and all evidence should be 
suppressed. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Proffitt's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Proffitt's Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
Mr. Proffitt asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress the evidence stemming from his unlawful seizure. Specifically, he asserts that 
the State failed to demonstrate that the officers had probable cause to stop him for 
violating Idaho Code § 49-808(2) as it was not objectively reasonable to believe 
Mr. Proffitt had not travelled 100 feet with his turn-signal on prior to changing lanes, 
based upon Officer Matheus' testimony that his turn signal was on two seconds prior to 
changing lanes and both Officer Matheus' and Officer Rush's testimony regarding his 
rate of travel. 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence 
The standard of review of the trial court's ruling on a suppression motion is 
bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, 
but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State 
v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). The power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses testifying at a suppression hearing, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Reyna, 142 Idaho 624, 
626 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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The Fourth Amendment2 to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Its purpose is "to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion 
by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to 'safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)). 
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is therefore subject to 
the Fourth Amendment restraints. Id. at 653. 
Not all vehicle stops, however, violate Fourth Amendment protections. Police 
may stop a vehicle either where there is probable cause to believe the driver is violating 
either a traffic law or equipment regulation, or may temporarily seize a vehicle and its 
occupants for investigative purposes if the officer has an objectively reasonable basis 
for suspecting that the vehicle or an occupant is involved in criminal activity under the 
standards established by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Id. at 661-663; see also 
State v. Schmidt, 121 Idaho 381, 383 (Ct. App. 1992). Probable cause to seize and/or 
arrest is an objective standard requiring information sufficient to lead a person of 
ordinary care and prudence to believe or hold a strong and honest presumption that the 
person seized is guilty of the crime or violation allegedly committed. Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-137 (1996). If 
evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
2 Mr. Proffitt does not assert that Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides 
greater protections to individuals in the context of seizures based upon alleged traffic 
infractions. 
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the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
C. Officers Lacked Probable Cause To Believe Mr. Proffitt Violated Any Traffic 
Laws; Therefore, His Warrantless Seizure Was Unreasonable 
Idaho Code § 49-808(2) reads as follows: 
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be 
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways 
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given 
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other 
instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled 
by the vehicle before turning. 
I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added). Mr. Proffitt was not turning from a parked position, 
and was pulled over on Franklin Road in Boise which, as both parties and the district 
court recognized, is not a "controlled-access highway" (Tr. 11/5/12, p.10, L.24 - p.11, 
L.5; p.88, Ls.1-4; p.92, Ls.13-17; p.100, Ls.3-13); as such, the five-second clause is not 
applicable. Therefore, the State bore the burden of demonstrating that the officers had 
probable cause to believe that Mr. Proffitt signaled his intention to change lanes for less 
than 100 feet prior to actually changing lanes. 
During a hearing on the suppression motion, Officer Matheus testified that she 
saw Mr. Proffitt's car change lanes "without using their turn signal for 100 feet or for five 
seconds." (Tr. 11/5/12, p.9, L.13 - p.11, L.5.)3 She testified that "[t]he distance didn't 
seem to be 100 feet. It seemed like it had traveled maybe the length of its car three 
times before it maneuvered over into the next lane." (Tr. 11/5/12, p.12, Ls.11-19.) On 
3 Both Officer Matheus and Officer Rush testified about their contact with Mr. Proffitt 
once he was seized and which ultimately led to his ultimate arrest and search. (See 
generally Tr. 11/5/12.) Because Mr. Proffitt does not challenge the district court's ruling 
on this basis, he does not discuss that testimony in this brief in detail. 
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cross-examination, Officer Matheus testified that she believed the speed limit to be 35 
miles per hour; that although she did not know exactly how fast Mr. Proffitt was driving, 
there was no indication that he was driving either faster or slower than the speed limit; 
and, that he was not pulled over for any speeding violations. (Tr. 11/5/12, p.24, L.12 -
p.25, L.14.) She later testified that Mr. Proffitt had used his turn signal for about two 
seconds and traveled approximately 40 feet before changing lanes. (Tr. 11/5/12, p.28, 
Ls.2-16.) Officer Rush testified that he pulled Mr. Proffitt's car over because Officer 
Matheus told him about the alleged turn signal violation but he did not see it himself. 
(Tr. 11/5/12, p.49, L.1 - p.51, L.8.) On cross-examination, he testified that he believes 
the speed limit was 30 miles per hour but it may have been 35 miles per hour and that 
nothing about Mr. Proffitt's rate of travel caught his attention "one way or the other." (Tr. 
11/5/12, p.67, L.21 - p.68, L.16.) 
The district court ultimately found that officers had probable cause to believe that 
Mr. Proffitt did not signal his intention to change lanes for at least the last 100 feet. (Tr. 
11 /5/12, p.105, L.21 - p.106, L.8.) The Court stated, 
I still find that when you take the totality of the circumstances as testified 
by the officers and that their referral that was terminology, including both, 
as well as their testimony more specifically, 40 feet, two seconds, less 
than 100 feet throughout their testimony, that that is what the Court's 
going to put the weight of the testimony and conclude that the State has 
met its burden of proving that it was a proper stop, and they had probably 
cause for the stop[.] 
Id. Mr. Proffitt does not challenge the district court's apparent finding that Mr. Proffitt 
signaled for two seconds; however, to the extent that the district court found that his 
signaling for two seconds equated to his travelling less than 100 feet prior to changing 
lanes, the court's finding is clearly erroneous as it is not supported by evidence in the 
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record.4 Absent evidence of Mr. Proffitt's rate of travel while signaling, there was 
insufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion. 
Distance travelled between two points in time is easily measurable provided both 
the speed and time are known. (Distance= rate x time.) The State, however, failed to 
present any definitive evidence as to Mr. Proffitt's rate of travel while he was signaling 
his intention to change lanes as the speed limit was either 30 or 35 miles per hour and 
he was travelling near the speed limit. (Tr. 11/5/12, p.24, L.12 - p.25, L.14; p.67, L.21 -
p.68, L.16.) There are 5,280 feet in a mile and 3,600 seconds in an hour. A vehicle 
travelling at a rate 30 miles per hour for a period two seconds travels approximately 88 
feet. (44 feet per second (rate) (30 x 5280 feet= 158,400 feet per hour I 3,600 seconds 
= 44 feet per second)) x 2 seconds (time) = 88 feet (distance).) Thus, if Mr. Proffitt was 
travelling at 30 miles per hour while using his turn signal for approximately 2 seconds, 
he would have travelled approximately 88 feet prior to changing lanes and probable 
cause to believe he violated I.C. 49-808(2) would exist. However, a vehicle travelling 35 
miles per hour for a period of two seconds travels approximately 102.66 feet. (51.33 
feet per second (rate) (35 x 5280 = 184,800 ft per hour I 3,600 = 51.33 feet per second) 
x 2 seconds (time) = 102.66 feet (distance).) This, of course, would not be a violation of 
I.C. § 49-808(2). Because the State did not provide the district court with evidence of 
Mr. Proffitt's speed there was insufficient evidence for the district court to conclude how 
far Mr. Proffitt travelled with his turn-signal on prior to changing lanes. 
4 To the extent the district court held that there was sufficient evidence to believe that 
Mr. Proffitt only travelled 40 feet prior to changing lanes, the district court's finding is 
clearly erroneous as will be demonstrated below. 
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'The application of probable cause to arrest must allow room for some mistakes 
by the arresting officer; however, the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting 
on facts leading sensibly to their conclusion of probability." State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 
870, 874 (2000) (citing Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir.1969); 
Julian, 129 Idaho at 137.) Officer Matheus, in this case, did not act reasonably in 
concluding that there was probable cause to believe that Mr. Proffitt had not signaled for 
at least 100 feet prior to changing lanes. During the suppression hearing, she testified 
as follows: 
Q. Okay, do you know what the speed limit is on Franklin at that area? 
A. I believe it is 35. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of how fast the defendant was driving his 
car? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Okay. So he wasn't tagged with radar or anything like that? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say that your estimate of how fast he was 
going would have to have been a visual estimate? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you have any kind of indication that he was going faster than the 
speed limit or slower than the speed limit --
A. No. 
Q. Or do you have any estimate as to that at all? 
A. No. 
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Q. Okay. So, to the best of your recollection, he appeared to be going the 
speed limit? 
A. Sure. 
(Tr. 11/5/12, p.24, L.15 - p.26, L.22.) Thus, by her own estimate (35 MPH x 2 seconds) 
Mr. Proffitt would have travelled approximately 102.66 feet with his turn signal on prior 
to changing lanes and, thus, the information known to Officer Matheus would have 
shown a reasonable person that Mr. Proffit did NOT violate I.C. § 49-808(2). 
Officer Matheus demonstrated that she, in fact, was not acting reasonable in her 
calculations testifying as follows: 
Q. Now, you also in your report indicated that to the best of your estimate 
the vehicle traveled approximately 40 feet or two seconds. Does that 
sound familiar? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And do you stick by that? Is that what you believe to be 
accurate, 40 feet or two seconds? 
A. Yes 
Q. Okay. Now, how would you have determined that two-second period of 
time? 
A. The blinker was on for about two seconds before - while I was 
transitioning over. And it's by-wise and two seconds. That's usually the 
way I look at the blinker. 
(Tr. 11/5/12, p.28, Ls.2-16.) 
Officer Matheus' estimation that Mr. Proffitt only traveled 40 feet with his turn-
signal on prior to changing lanes is easily disproven and, to the extent the court agreed 
with her calculation, the court's finding is clearly erroneous. In order for Mr. Proffitt to 
have travelled only 40 feet in 2 seconds, he would have been travelling at a rate of 20 
feet per second. (20 feet per second (rate) x 2 seconds (time) = 40 feet (distance).) 20 
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feet per second equals approximately 13.66 miles per hour. (20 feet x 3,600 seconds = 
72,000 feet per hour; 72,000 feet per hour/ 5280 = 13.66 miles per hour.) Thus, by her 
own calculation, Mr. Proffitt would have to have been travelling at less than half the 
posted speed limit, regardless of whether the speed limit was 30 or 35 miles per hour, in 
order to travel only 40 feet in a period of 2 seconds. As both Officer Matheus and 
Officer Rush testified Mr. Proffitt was travelling at or near the posted speed limit, which 
while not precisely established during the suppression hearing was either 30 or 35 miles 
per hour, Officer Matheus' 40 feet calculation is clearly wrong. As calculating distance 
is a well-established and relatively simple formula, it was simply an unreasonable 
calculation by a POST certified officer. 
As it was the State's burden to demonstrate that there was probable cause to 
believe that Mr. Proffitt had not travelled 100 feet with his turn signal on prior to 
changing lanes, it was the State's burden to demonstrate how fast he was travelling for 
the two seconds that Officer Matheus observed he was using his signal. It appears in 
this case that Officer Matheus did not even attempt to make a mathematical calculation; 
rather, she made a visual calculation that was easily disproven by the use of relatively 
simple mathematics. 5 As the United States Supreme Court recognized over 30 years 
ago, 
5 The State may argue that it is not objectively reasonable to expect officers to calculate 
an exact distance in real world conditions such as the officers themselves driving and 
not having access to a calculator. Such an argument would miss the point for two 
reasons: 1) officers need only determine whether the vehicle signaled for more or less 
than 100 feet and need not calculate the exact distance traveled during a known period 
of time; and 2) the officers would not have to make the calculations at all if they were 
provided with training and a simple cheat sheet, i.e., 25 MPH= just less than 3 seconds, 
35 MPH = just less than 2 seconds, 45 MPH = 1.5 seconds, 55 MPH = 1.2 seconds, etc. 
Surely such training could be made available through POST. Officer Matheus' 40 feet 
11 
An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all 
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its 
use are subject to government regulation. Automobile travel is a basic, 
pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one's 
home, workplace, and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours 
each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many 
find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile 
than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of 
travel. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) at 662. While occupants of vehicles 
driving on public roads have less of an expectation of privacy than occupants of a 
private home, a privacy expectation still exists. Government officials can't violate that 
expectation absent an objectively reasonable basis to do so. Officer Matheus did not 
act reasonably in concluding that Mr. Proffitt violated I.C. § 49-808(2), and the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
D. All Evidence Obtained, Including Mr. Proffitt's Actions Leading To His Arrest And 
Search Were Products Of The Unlawful Seizure And Should Be Suppressed 
If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded 
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). It 
is undisputed that Mr. Proffitt was pulled-over for the sole reason of his purported 
violation of I.C. § 49-808(2). Therefore, all evidence obtained subsequent to this initial 
seizure should be suppressed and the district court erred by failing to do so. 
in 2 seconds calculation demonstrates the unreasonableness of not providing such 
training and a cheat sheet. Surely, reliance upon the officer's un-trained best guess is 
not reasonable especially when the guess is so easily demonstrated to be false. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Proffitt respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress, 
with instructions that all evidence obtained flowing from the initial seizure be 
suppressed. 
DATED this 1st day of August, 2013. 
JASQ C. PINTLER 
De~t'cfty State Appellate Public Defender 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of August, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
JAMIE LEON PROFFITT 
3930 W PINE AVE 
BOISE ID 83703 
TIM HANSEN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
ANTHONY GEDDES 
ADA CO PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
JCP/khc 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
14 
